Pest dispersion as a spatial interaction: The case of *Flavescence Dorée*

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1 – Introduction


- 2 Model
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Flavescence Dorée



- Bacterial disease of vines
- High quantitative loss
- No cure actually
- Mandatory vines removal, treatment against vector

Scaphoideus Titanus





Economic considerations

Two opposite externalities from treatments

Reduced risk for neighboring vineyards:
 Social benefit > Private benefit

Environmental damage on ecosystems:
 Social cost > Private cost

 \Rightarrow Strong societal debate about compulsory treatment



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Linear probability model


The probability of infection for a given vineyard i

$$p_i = b(oldsymbol{x}_i;oldsymbol{eta}) + au t_i + heta \sum\limits_{j \in N_i} (t_j/n) +
ho \sum\limits_{j \in N_i} (p_j/n) + arepsilon_i$$

Linear probability model

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Micro-economic program

$$\max_{t_i \in [0,1]} \left\{ \mathbb{E}[\pi_i] \equiv (1-p_i)r_i - c \cdot t_i
ight\}$$

Corner solutions allow to define differentiated behaviors

Micro-economic program

$$\max_{t_i \in [0,1]} \left\{ \mathbb{E}[\pi_i] \equiv (1-p_i)r_i - c \cdot t_i
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Corner solutions allow to define differentiated behaviors

Farseeing behavior: treatment if $\frac{c}{r_i} < | \tau + (\rho/n)\theta + (\rho/n)^2 \sum \psi_j |$ Myopic behaviour:treatment if $\frac{c}{r_i} < | \tau + (\rho/n)\theta |$ Naive behaviour:treatment if $\frac{c}{r_i} < | \tau |$

Social planner perspective

Max. expected profits simultaneously with an additional social cost

$$\max_{\{t_\ell\}_L} \left\{ \mathbb{E}ig[\Piig] \equiv \sum_\ell ig[(1-p_\ell)r_\ell - (c+\omega)t_\ellig]
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Social planner perspective

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It is socially optimal that treated vineyards are such that:

$$\displaystyle \underbrace{rac{\omega}{r_i}}_{+} + \underbrace{\sum_{j
eq i} rac{\partial p_j}{\partial t_\ell} imes rac{r_j}{r_i}}_{-} + rac{c}{r_i} < \mid au + (
ho/n) heta + (
ho/n)^2 \sum \psi_j \mid$$

Simulations

Parameters β , τ , θ and ρ are estimated econometrically


Average returns estimated from vineyard prices $r_i = v_i imes (\delta - \gamma)$

Additional assumptions:


- Capitalization factor $\delta \gamma = 0.02$
- ▶ FD contamination means 5 years of production loss
- Private cost of treatment c = 25 euros/ ha
- ▶ Social cost of treatment $\omega \in [0, 300]$ euros/ ha

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
2013-2016 contamination, compulsory treatments




Annual returns per hectare in 2016



Spatial weight matrix



Spatial weight matrix (zoom)




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
Spatial econometric estimation

Coef	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
au	-0.31^{**}	-0.27^{**}	-0.48^{**}	-0.52^{**}
	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.103)	(0.094)
heta	-0.15^{**}	-0.1^{**}	-0.04^{**}	-0.2^{**}
	(0.118)	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.094)
ho	$+0.64^{**}$	$+0.71^{**}$	$+0.62^{**}$	$+0.27^{**}$
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.064)
N	6672	6672	6672	6672
pred	77.1	75.2	72.9	73.5
W	Contg	Dist	Contg	Contg
Method	MCMC	MCMC	AML	GMM


Proba of contamination with compulsory treatment



Proba of contamination without treatment



Expected value of treatment




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5 – Simulation


6 – Conclusion

A tax is not a solution



Negative externality (in euro/ha) as a tax

Spatial mismatch



Negative externality (social cost of treatment in euro/ha)

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- Naive and myopia behaviors could be good for the environment but can be used to justify mandatory treatment
- Mandatory treatment is justified for naive behavior without social cost of treatments (on around 30% of vineyards)
- Forbidden treatment is justified for farseeing behavior with high social cost of treatment (on around 30% of vineyards)



- Endogenous prospecting efforts with fine-scale data
- Strategically consistent behavior, endogenous land use
- Increase the robustness checks and policy scenarios

Thank you